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Employment Law.  City of Cranston v. International Brotherhood 
of Police Officers, Local 301, 230 A.3d 564 (R.I. 2020).  Employees’ 
Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI)’s Retirement Board 
does not possess statutory authority to unilaterally retire police 
officers.  De facto retirement may not be found by an officer taking 
on secondary employment without permission if prior officers acted 
similarly without repercussion.  Conditional retirement offers must 
be fully satisfied to be binding.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Daniel W. Nuey, Sr., (Nuey) was employed as a sergeant in the 
Cranston Police Department, and left work early on June 25, 2013, 
due to “uncontrollable levels of stress and anxiety.”1  Subsequently, 
Nuey received injured-on-duty (IOD) benefits pursuant to an 
agreement with the City of Cranston (the City) and applied for 
accidental disability retirement shortly thereafter.2 
Nuey’s accidental disability retirement application was denied 
by the ERSRI Retirement Board and was denied a second time after 
Nuey requested reconsideration.3  Nuey then applied for ordinary 
disability retirement, which the Retirement Board approved on 
1. City of Cranston v. Int’l Bhd., Local 301, 230 A.3d 564, 565 (R.I. 2020).
2. Id. at 565.  Nuey accepted an offer to work for the Mashpee Wampa-
noag Gaming Authority Board of Directors while receiving IOD benefits, but 
before his application for retirement was decided.  Id. at 565–66.  While com-
municating with Nuey, “the Department requested that Nuey have his em-
ployer send a letter describing the role and responsibilities of his secondary 
employment so that the Department could seek out a medical opinion.  How-
ever, it is clear from the record that Nuey never provided such a letter.”  Id. at 
566 n.2. 
3. Id. at 566.  The application first went to ERSRI’s Disability Subcom-
mittee, which voted to recommend that the Retirement Board deny Nuey’s ap-
plication.  Id.  The Retirement Board accepted the recommendation and denied 
the application.  Id.  Upon reconsideration, the Disability Subcommittee again 
recommended that the Retirement Board deny Nuey’s application for acci-
dental disability retirement.  Id. 
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March 15, 2017.4  Following the award for ordinary disability 
retirement, Nuey wrote to the City asking “[to] be put on the City’s 
pension roll effective end of day immediately,” but offered to retire 
only if the City would pay the difference between an accidental and 
ordinary disability pension as a supplemental pension.5  The City 
ignored Nuey’s conditions, placed him on ordinary disability 
retirement, and ceased his IOD benefits on May 12, 2017.6  The City 
rejected Nuey’s later request to withdraw his retirement offer.7 
The International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 
(the Union), filed this action and demanded arbitration under the 
collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City.8  
At the trial court level, the parties disputed whether Nuey was 
retired, and thus whether the Union had standing to represent 
him.9  In its memorandum, the City argued that Nuey retired as a 
matter of law when the Retirement Board granted his application 
for ordinary disability retirement, and further argued that Nuey 
retired de facto from his conduct.10  The Union filed a memorandum 
arguing that the Retirement Board did not have statutory authority 
to unilaterally retire police officers and that Nuey’s conduct did not 
show retirement as a matter of fact.11  The Union also moved to join 
the Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS) as a party.12  
In its memorandum, MERS stated that its role was not to retire 
4. Id.  Nuey has appealed his denied application for accidental disability
retirement in the Workers’ Compensation Court; that appeal is still pending. 
Id.; id. at n.4; see 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-21.2-9(f) (West 2020) (a party 
aggrieved by the Retirement Board’s determination on an accidental disability 
retirement application may appeal the decision to the Workers’ Compensation 
Court).  
5. Id. at 566–67 (citing CRANSTON, R.I. ORDINANCES ch. 2.20.080 (May 31,
2018), repealed by CRANSTON, R.I. ORDINANCES 2018-29 § 1 (Oct. 22, 2018) 
(where a disabled police officer was denied an accidental disability retirement 
but awarded an ordinary disability retirement, the City shall provide a supple-
mental pension to make up the difference payable to the officer directly)). 
6. Id. at 567.
7. Id.
8. Id.  The Union alleged that terminating Nuey’s IOD benefits violated
the collective bargaining agreement.  Id. 
9. Id.; see also id. at 569 (citing Providence School Board v. Providence
Teachers Union, Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO, 68 A.3d 505, 509 (R.I. 2013)). 
10. Id. at 568.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 567.  The Union moved to join MERS as a party because the
Union believed that MERS had an interest in the outcome.  Id. 
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employees and produced its retirement form which was not 
completed or signed by Nuey, showing that he had not officially 
retired.13   
Upon reviewing the record, the trial court found that Nuey had 
not retired as a matter of either law or fact.14  The City then moved 
for reconsideration and to reopen the record, and offered an 
affidavit stating that the City paid $63,346.33 to Nuey as part of a 
termination payment.15  The Union objected to the motion and 
moved to compel arbitration.16  The trial justice denied the City’s 
motion and compelled arbitration.17  The City appealed, arguing 
that the trial justice erred in finding that Nuey was not retired and 
that the trial justice erred in denying the City’s motion for 
reconsideration.18 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first sought to 
determine whether Nuey retired as a matter of law or fact.19  The 
Court first examined section 36-8-2 to determine whether the 
General Assembly vested the Retirement Board with the authority 
to unilaterally retire officers.20  From the statutory language, the 
Court determined that the General Assembly intended the 
Retirement Board to determine retirement eligibility and provide 
retirement allowances, but the language does not give the 
13. Id. at 568.  The MERS form requires all ERSRI members and the re-
tiring officer to complete the form for the officer to receive an ordinary disabil-
ity pension.  Id.  The form serves as a certification that the officer has termi-
nated his or her employment and allows for proper retirement allowances to 
be calculated.  Id. at 570.  The MERS form was sent to Nuey after the Retire-
ment Board approved his ordinary disability retirement application, but Nuey 
did not execute and return the form.  Id. at 571. 
14. Id. at 568.
15. Id.  The affiant was Francesca Solitro, Payroll & Benefits Administra-
tor for the City of Cranston.  Id. at n.11. 
16. Id. at 568.  The Union’s motion appears from the record to be an oral
motion during a hearing on the City’s motion for reconsideration.  Id. at n.12. 
17. Id. at 568–69.
18. Id. at 569.  The City also appealed on the grounds that the trial judge
erred in relying on the MERS form, but the Court does not discuss this issue 
at length as the Court believed that the City waived this argument.  Id. at 574–
75. 
19. Id. at 570–71, 574–75.
20. Id. at 570–71 (citing 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-8-2 (West 2020)).
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Retirement Board authority to unilaterally retire officers.21  
Although the Board must determine an employee’s eligibility for 
retirement,22 the Court views retirement as “embrac[ing] two 
elements: the Retirement Board’s determination of the employee’s 
eligibility, followed by the cessation of the employee’s 
employment.”23  The Court’s interpretation coincides with the plain 
meaning of the word “retirement,” which the Court defines as a 
voluntary termination of employment.24  Thus, the Court concluded 
that in order for Nuey to be retired as a matter of law, Nuey must 
take affirmative steps to terminate his own employment with the 
Department.25  The Court found, based on the record, that Nuey 
did not take any affirmative steps to retire because he never 
returned the MERS form following the Retirement Board’s 
approval of his application.26  Therefore, the Court found that the 
Retirement Board did not have the statutory authority to 
unilaterally retire Nuey, and that Nuey did not take affirmative 
steps to retire as a matter of law.27 
The Court next examined whether Nuey’s conduct evinced 
retirement as a matter of fact.  The City contended that Nuey 
showed his intent to retire by applying for a disability pension, 
informing the City of his intent to retire, and by working for the 
Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority without City approval.28  
The Court reviewed Nuey’s letter de novo and found that it did not 
show an intent to retire since the letter, on two separate occasions, 
expressly stated Nuey’s statutorily grounded conditions for 
retirement, and the City rejected those conditions.29 
21. Id. at 571.
22. Id. at 570.  An officer may apply for ordinary disability retirement un-
der Rhode Island General Laws section 45-21-19(a).  The Retirement Board 
may grant the application under section 45-21-19(c). 
23. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 571–72 (citing retirement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019); see also id. at n.15 (excluding references to involuntary retirement). 
25. See id. at 572.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 573.
28. Id. at 574.  The Court addressed the secondary employment issue and
found that since the City had previously allowed injured officers to work while 
on IOD status, Nuey’s work was not indicative of retirement.  Id. at 566 at n.3. 
29. Id. at 574; see CRANSTON, R.I. ORDINANCES ch. 2.20.080 (May 31, 2018),
repealed by CRANSTON, R.I. ORDINANCES 2018-29 § 1 (Oct. 22, 2018). 
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Finally, the Court examined whether the trial justice erred in 
denying the City’s motion for reconsideration and to reopen the 
record.30  The City argued that the trial justice erred by not 
considering their affidavit and evidence of the termination payment 
in his denial of the motion.31  Upon de novo review of the record, 
the Court concluded that the trial justice did consider this evidence 
in his order and was within his discretion to rule against the City 
on their motion.32  Ultimately, the Court found against the City, 
concluding that the Retirement Board is not vested with statutory 
authority to unilaterally retire officers, Nuey did not retire as a 
matter of law or fact, and that the trial justice did not err by ruling 
against the City on its motion to reconsider and reopen the record.33 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s ruling set clear boundaries 
on the scope of the Retirement Board’s authority and restates the 
burden on municipalities to follow statutory retirement procedure. 
While the Court acknowledged the legislative intent for the 
Retirement Board to hold an integral role, it also found from the 
statutory language that the Board’s authority ends at determining 
retirement eligibility.34  After the Retirement Board approves a 
request for retirement, an officer seeking retirement “must then 
complete various tasks, including the execution and filing of certain 
forms” to terminate employment.35  This reinforces the notion that 
retirement is a volitional act performed by the officer in question, 
not the municipality.  Thus, the ruling in this case places a burden 
on the municipality to strictly follow statutory procedure and its 
own ordinances for officer retirement. 
The Court also disposed of the City’s argument that taking on 
secondary employment is indicative of retirement.36  The Court 
acknowledged that Nuey breached Department rules by taking on 
secondary employment without securing a medical opinion, but the 
Court found that previous officers had done the same without 
30. Id. at 575.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 576.
34. Id. at 570–71; see 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-8-2 (West 2020).
35. Id. at 570.
36. Id. at 574.
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repercussion.37  Disposing of these facts and the inference 
therefrom may make it difficult for a municipality to show de facto 
retirement.  Thus, this ruling implicitly places more weight on legal 
retirement and the completion of forms terminating employment, 
such as the MERS form. 
As such, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in this case sought 
to enforce the Union’s rights and hold municipalities accountable 
for failing to follow statutory procedure.  The ruling also gives great 
leverage to officers in negotiating their retirement terms.38  An 
officer may impose conditions on their retirement pursuant to local 
ordinances, and a municipality may not simply ignore them when 
retiring the officer.39  Thus, even if an officer negotiates retirement 
with a municipality, but their conditions for retirement are ignored, 
the officer may seek arbitration and be represented by their 
suzerain union.  This case displays the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court’s position on protecting police officers and ensuring them an 
opportunity to redress grievances encountered in retirement 
proceedings.  However, it is unclear whether this decision may 
apply to disputes involving other unions or professions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Employees’ 
Retirement System of Rhode Island Retirement Board does not 
possess the statutory authority to unilaterally retire police officers. 
The Court determined that the legislature solely intended for the 
Retirement Board to determine retirement eligibility and calculate 
retirement and pension allowances.  The Court further determined 
that an officer taking on secondary employment, even without 
permission, may not constitute de facto retirement if the 
municipality allowed previous officers to do so without 
repercussion.  Finally, the Court determined that a municipality  
37. See id. at 566, n.3.
38. See id. at 574.
39. See id.; see also CRANSTON, R.I. ORDINANCES ch. 2.20.080 (May 31,
2018), repealed by CRANSTON, R.I. ORDINANCES 2018-29 § 1 (Oct. 22, 2018). 
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may not retire an officer while ignoring the officer’s conditions for 
retirement if those conditions are grounded in local ordinances. 
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